A Triadic Approach to Deception in Strategic Counterintelligence Operations by Editor, IBPP
International Bulletin of Political 
Psychology 
Volume 18 Issue 3 Article 4 
8-27-2018 
A Triadic Approach to Deception in Strategic Counterintelligence 
Operations 
Editor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp 
 Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, International Relations Commons, Other Political 
Science Commons, Other Psychology Commons, and the Philosophy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Editor (2018) "A Triadic Approach to Deception in Strategic Counterintelligence Operations," International 
Bulletin of Political Psychology: Vol. 18 : Iss. 3 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol18/iss3/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in International Bulletin of Political Psychology by an authorized administrator of Scholarly 
Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu. 
Title:  A Triadic Approach to Deception in Strategic Counterintelligence Operations 
Author: Editor 
 
Empirical psychological research is proliferating on deception detection in the context of 
interviews, interrogation, conversation, written narratives, and extemporaneous and 
formal remarks.  There are several presumptions behind this research.  One is that 
there is a discrete psychological phenomenon, viz., the intention to maintain, create, or 
influence some sort of misperception in one or more people, that can be systematically 
studied (1).  Another is that there are indicators causing or correlated with the 
phenomenon that can be reliably and validly identified (2).  Yet another is that there are 
communication tactics and strategies that can make the identification of these indicators 
easier or more difficult (3).  These tactics and strategies can be employed not only by 
anyone seeking to deceive but also to tell the truth, e.g., both interrogator and 
interrogatee.  Although research continues to yield generalizations supporting these 
presumptions, the magic bullets and litmus tests of knowledge that can ensure accurate 
determinations with specific people in specific situations have not been and may not be 
identified (4). 
This shortfall also characterizes deception attempts employed in strategic 
counterintelligence operations.  These operations are initiated by representatives of 
countries, governments, non-government organizations, and transnational groups.  
These representatives seek to influence the collection, analysis, clandestine/covert 
operations, and counterintelligence capabilities of targets such as adversaries, neutrals, 
and even allies.  The intent of the initiator is to develop, maintain, or otherwise influence 
a misperception in the target leading to behavior supportive of the initiator’s strategic 
goals and detrimental to or less supportive of the strategic goals of the target. 
Examples abound.  The target collects the wrong information; comes to inaccurate 
interpretations of the right information; launches clandestine/covert operations that are 
likely to achieve the wrong ends; tactical counterintelligence resources will be dedicated 
to the wrong threat or the right threat with the wrong combination of resources.  The 
very strategic goals of the target may be conceived by the target in a manner 
detrimental to the target’s military, political, economic, and socio-cultural viability.          
But there are complications.  At the very moment the initiator is planning against the 
target, the target is planning against the initiator.  The very deception attempted by the 
initiator is actually desired by the target, because it fits into a larger deception intended 
by the target against the initiator.  So, the initiator is also a target, the target also an 
initiator. 
And on the global stage there is a third actor, the observer, watching what’s happening 
between initiator and target.  Watching what works and what doesn’t to be used in 
deception attempts against initiator and target sometime in the future.  Yet pure 
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observation is unlikely in that the observer concurrently may be an initiator and/or target 
in relation to the initiator and target being observed.  We’re left with a triadic conception 
of the world of strategic counterintelligence, and one that is hyper-dimensional and 
characterized as a hyperreality.  The former denotes the same actor on the global stage 
becoming and being an initiator, target, and observer at any moment in the present, 
past, and future.  The latter denotes the consequence of the hyper-dimensional and is 
best described by the French philosopher Jean Baudrillard--an inability of to differentiate 
reality from a simulation of reality, especially in societies characterized by technological 
change and cultural skepticism as to the nature of truth.  A recently published article on 
triadic influence attempts supports at least some of the above analysis (6). 
A conclusion might be that empirical psychological research can only take us so far 
without the interpretive and narrative approaches to meaning and knowledge from 
historiography, hermeneutics, exegesis, and literary criticism (7).  Just as the Dutch 
philosopher Desiderius Erasmus noted that in the kingdom of the blind, the one-eyed 
man is king (8), in the world of deception the American director Stanley Kubrick noted 
that our eyes are wide shut (9).  
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